Torts - Firearms - Liability for Sale to Minor in Violation of Criminal Statute by Dennis, James L.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 20 | Number 4
June 1960
Torts - Firearms - Liability for Sale to Minor in
Violation of Criminal Statute
James L. Dennis
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
James L. Dennis, Torts - Firearms - Liability for Sale to Minor in Violation of Criminal Statute, 20 La. L. Rev. (1960)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol20/iss4/21
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of heat to be supplied to passengers and not the degree of care
to be used. Since it would be impossible to satisfy the needs of
everyone, it would seem that the only reasonable course of con-
duct a carrier could take would be to provide heat for persons
of ordinary sensitivity.13 This is distinguishable from the duty
owed by a carrier in other situations such as avoiding accidents
and undue delays where the exercise of care operates for the
benefit of all passengers regardless of their health conditions.
It is submitted that the carrier should be liable for injuries
to feeble or infirm persons in its general operations even though
no injury would have resulted to persons of ordinary health.
It is true that they have not been so held in the "heat cases," but
these should not be extended, for the reasons indicated. The
common carrier serves a large, indeterminate group of individ-
uals and should conduct its operations with care consistent with
the knowledge that some of its passengers may be feeble and
infirm.
Martin Smith, Jr.
TORTS - FIREARMS - LIABILITY FOR SALE TO MINOR
IN VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE
Plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old minor, sued to recover damages
for the loss of his thumb caused by the accidental discharge of
a rifle sold him by defendant. The sale was made in violation of
a city ordinance which prohibited the sale of deadly weapons to
minors under seventeen, and of a state statute which proscribed
the sale of any pistol, repeating rifle, bowie knife, brass
knuckles, or sling-shot to any minor. The trial court excluded
the defense of contributory negligence' and granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. The district court of appeal af-
firmed the granting of the motion for summary judgment hold-
ing that defendant's violation of the statute and ordinance
amounted to negligence in itself. The trial court's rejection of
the defense of contributory negligence was affirmed on the
ground that the statute and the ordinance were designed to pro-
tect minors against their own carelessness. On certiorari to the
13. Stated differently, the risk of injury to the class of passengers sensitive
to cold cannot be protected by any course of conduct of the carrier without the
possibility of endangering that class of passengers sensitive to heat. See Annot.,
33 A.L.R.2d § 1358 (1954).
1. The defense was grounded on defendant's carelessness in holding the barrel
of a rifle he knew to be loaded while riding in an automobile.
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Florida Supreme Court, held, writ discharged and district court
of appeal decision approved. Violation of a statute designed to
protect minors against the risk of injury by firearms is negli-
gence per se, and the minor's contributory negligence is not a de-
fense. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
Where a civil cause of action is predicated upon defendant's
violation of a criminal statute designed to protect minors against
the risk of bodily harm caused by their immaturity or inexperi-
ence, the majority of courts have held that contributory negli-
gence per se, and the minor's contributory negligence is not a de-
jury.2 This is based on the theory that self-injury is the very
type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. However,
some courts admit contributory negligence as a defense, stating
that the violation of the statute is not the proximate cause of the
damage, or that the defendant could not have foreseen the in-
jury.3
Although a proper application of the statutory duty not to
sell firearms to minors may in most cases achieve the same re-
sult as would the common law duty to use reasonable care, the
duty imposed by a statute of this kind is not predicated on fault.4
2. E.g., cases involving violation of child labor acts: Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley,
146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920) ; Dusha v. Virginia & Rainey Lake Co., 145
Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920) ; Karples v. Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. 101
(1919) ; Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Min. Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 Ati. 642 (1907)
Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473, 140 N.W. 84 (1913).
See cases involving illegal sale of dangerous substances to children: Pidrson v.
London, 102 Pa. Super. 176, 156 Atl. 719 (1931); Pizzo v. Wieman, 149 Wis.
235, 134 N.W. 899 (1912) ; Burr v. Hatch, 38 Pa. County Ct. 161 (1881).
3. A substantial minority allow contributory negligence as a defense for viola-
tion of a child labor act, e.g., Darsam v. Kohlman, 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909) ;
Smith v. National Coal & Ice Co., 135 Ky. 671, 117 S.W. 280 (1909) ; Berdos v.
Tremont & S. Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N.E. 876 (1911) ; Besonem v. Campbell,
243 Mich. 209, 220 N.W. 301 (1928) ; Boesel v. Wells, F. & Co., 260 Mo. 463, 169
S.W. 110 (1914) Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W.Va. 405, 69
S.E. 857 (1910) Morris v. Stanfield, 81 Ill. App. 264 (1899) ; Lee v. Sterling
Silk Mfg. Co., 115 App. Div. 589, 101 N.Y. Supp. 78 (1906) ; Belles v. Jackson,
4 Pa. D. & C. 194 (1893).
There is little judicial dissent concerning violations of statutes prohibiting the
sale of dangerous articles to minors, e.g., Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. 455, 161
S.E. 664 (1932) ; Decicco v. Vodrazka, 291 Ill. App. 612, 9 N.E.2d 451 (1937)
Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 185 Ill. App. 332, 106 N.E. 837 (1914)
Poland v. Earhart, 70 Iowa 285, 30 N.W. 637 (1886).
4. E.g., McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584, 119 Atl. 721 (1923) ; Pizzo v. Wie-
mann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W. 899 (1912). These cases involve statutes prohibit-
ing the sale of dangerous articles to minors.
See cases where employer held liable for violation of child labor act even
though he acted in good faith and employed the infant in ignorance of his age:
Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burns Mfg. Co., 250 Ill. 303, 95 N.E. 204 (1911) ; Blan-
ton v. Kellioka Coal Co., 192 Ky. 220, 232 S.W. 614 (1921) ; Dusha v. Virginia
& Rainey Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920) ; Krutlies v. Bulls Head
Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162, 94 Atl. 459 (1915).
See Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation to a Statute, 32
MINN. L. REv. 105, 118 (1948).
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The gun dealer who sells a weapon to a minor below the pre-
scribed age need not have foreseen the minor's negliegnce to be
held liable.5 This is liability analogous to that imposed upon per-
sons who employ children in violation of child labor acts.6 In
addition to this imposition of liability without fault, there is indi-
cation that the ambit of protection afforded third persons by
these statutes is more extensive than that provided by the com-
mon law duty to use reasonable care.7 Despite the fact that lia-
bility under criminal statutes designed for the protection of
minors is quite different from liability under ordinary rules of
negligence law, the decisions are almost invariably couched in
negligence language.8 This is an illustration of the general ten-
dency of courts to associate a statute with the type of common
law liability most closely related to the statute. Such an ap-
proach enables employment of the more familiar rules and doc-
trines that are generally applied innegligence controversies.9
Although a Louisiana statute ° prohibits the sale of firearms
and other dangerous weapons to minors, there are no reported
cases based on the illegal sale of a firearm to a minor.1' How-
ever, the courts have been faced with cases involving the analo-
gous situation of illegal employment of minors. 12 In Darsam v.
5. See Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907); Fowell
v. Grafton, 22 Ont. L.R. 550 (1910).
6. See Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920) ; Dusha
v. Virginia & Bainey Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920) ; Karples v.
Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E. 101 (1919) ; Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co.,
218 Pa. 311, 67 Atl. 642 (1907); Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473,
140 N.W. 84 (1913).
7. E.g., Sickles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1957) (vendor
held liable for sale of air rifle to the father of a minor because he knew the weapon
would be used by a minor under the age prescribed by a statute prohibiting the
sale of such weapons) ; Henningsen v. Markowitz, 230 N.Y. Supp. 313, 132 Misc.
547 (1928) (merchant who sold an air rifle to a minor was held liable to a third
person whom a friend of the minor had negligently shot after the parents of the
minor vendee had taken the gun from him and he had regained it).
8. E.g., Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530, 106 S.E. 585 (1921) ; Binford v.
Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, 42 Am. Rep. 508 (1882) ; Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn.
294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907) ; Zamora v. J. Korber & Co., 59 N.M. 33, 278 P.2d
569 (1954) ; Sickles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1957) ; Hen-
ningsen v. Markowitz, 230 N.Y. Supp. 313, 132 Misc. 547 (1928) ; McMillen v.
Steele, 275 Pa. 584, 11.9 Atl. 721 (1923) ; Wassel v. Ludwig, 92 Pa. Super. 341
(1927) ; Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 90 At]. 657 (1914) ; Schatter v. Bergen,
185 Wash. 375, 55 P.2d 344 (1936) ; Powell v. Grafton, 22 Ont. L.R. 550 (1910).
9. See Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947). See
also PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
10. LA. R.S. 14:91 (1950).
11. Third persons injured by minors entrusted with dangerous weapons are
afforded some measure of protection under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2318 (1870),
which provides for parents' vicarious liability for the torts of their children. E.g.,
Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917) ; Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La.
Ann. 92 (1885) ; Marionneaux v. Brugier, 35 La. Ann. 13 (1883) Phillips v.
D'Amico, 21 So.2d 748 (La. App. 1945) ; Wright v. Petty, 7 La. App. 584 (1927).
12. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (1943) ; Aymond v.
NOTES
Kohlman'3 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a minor's con-
tributory negligence was a defense in a suit based on the defend-
ant's violation of the child labor act.14 However, language in
later opinions casts some doubt on this conclusion.' 5
The statute in the instant case prohibited not only the sale
of firearms but also brass knuckles, bowie knives, and sling-shots
as well. It is arguable that this indicates an intention to protect
only third persons from harm caused by the aggressive conduct
of minors.' 6 The court, however, construed the same enactment
as being designed to protect minor vendees from negligent self-
injury. This is justified not only because the courts have tradi-
tionally attributed a two-fold nature to such statutes, but also
as a desirable policy of condemning more than one evil with the
same phrase. The exclusion of a defense based on contributory
negligence is consistent with this and appears to be grounded on
sound legal analysis. It would seem the plaintiff's contributory
negligence has no bearing whatsoever on the determination of
liability without fault under statutes of this kind. But even in
the absence of a statute, under the common law rules of negli-
gence the defendant's duty to use reasonable care toward the
plaintiff as a member of a characteristically careless class of
persons should not be excused because that carelessness is
evinced.
It is submitted that the holding in this case reflects a policy
of vigorous protection of children from bodily harm. Apparently
Western Union Tel. Co., 151 La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922) ; Flores v. Steeg Printing
& Publishing Co., 142 La. 1068, 78 So. 119 (1918) ; Alexander v. Standard Oil
Co., 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916) ; Dalberni v. New Orleans Can Co., 139 La.
49, 71 So. 214 (1916) ; Darsam v. Kohlman, 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909) ;
Cutrer v. Southdown Sugars, 42 So.2d 314 (La. App. 1949) ; Cropper v. Mills, 27
So.2d 764 (La. App. 1946) ; Bagesse v. Thistlewaite Lumber Co., 125 So. 322
(La. App. 1929).
13. 123 La. 164, 48 So. 781 (1909). Cf. Dalberni v. New Orleans Can Co., 139
La. 49, 71 So. 214 (1916).
14. LA. R.S. 23:161 et seq. (1950).
15. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (1943) ; Flores v.
Steeg Printing & Publishing Co., 142 La. 1068, 78 So. 119 (1918) ; Alexander v.
Standard Oil Co., 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916) ; Bagesse v. Thistlewaite Lumber
Co., 125 So. 322 (La. App. 1929).
Although there have been several cases denying recovery for injuries sustained
during employment in violation of the age certificate requirement and limited work
hour requirement for employees between the ages of 14 and 16, not since Darsam
v. Kohlman has recovery been denied in the face of a violation of the absolute
prohibition of employment of minors below 14.
16. Another interesting feature of the statute involved is that it prohibits only
the sale of pistols and Springfield or other repeating rifles. It is difficult to ap-
preciate why the legislature should have restricted its proscription to this type
of weapon. It is submitted, however, that this feature has little bearing on the
outcome of the present controversy.
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this is deemed to be an interest of paramount importance which
warrants the imposition of absolute statutory liability for its in-
vasion. The instant case appears to present a reasonable applica-
tion of a statute in furtherance of this policy.
James L. Dennis
TORTS - LIABILITY OF TAVERN KEEPERS FOR INJURIOUS
CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL SALES OF
INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Two recent decisions have imposed upon vendors of intoxi-
cating liquors a hitherto unrecognized liability. In a federal
case, plaintiffs sought damages for injuries sustained when their
automobile was struck in Michigan by an automobile the intoxi-
cated driver of which had been sold liquor by defendant tavern
keepers' in Illinois in violation of that state's criminal statute
2
prohibiting sales to intoxicated persons. The district court sus-
tained defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals, held, reversed. One who sells liquor
to an intoxicated person in violation of a criminal statute pro-
hibiting such sales is liable for injuries resulting from the
drunkenness to which the particular sale contributes. Waynick
v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1959).
In a New Jersey case, plaintiff sought damages for the death
of her husband resulting from a collision between an automobile
driven by him and one carelessly driven by an intoxicated minor
to whom the defendant tavern keepers had sold liquor in vio-
lation of a criminal statute3 and an administrative regulation 4
prohibiting sales to minors and intoxicated persons. The Law
Division granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court certified the matter on its own
motion and, held, reversed. A tavern keeper who sells intoxi-
cating liquor to a person whom he knows or should know to be
a minor or intoxicated is liable for injuries to third persons
resulting from such sales. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
156 A.2d 1 (1959).
1. The term "tavern keepers" is used herein to denote vendors of intoxicating
liquors generally. Specifically excluded are gifts by a social host to his guest.
2. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (Supp. 1959).
3. N.J. Stat. Ann. 33:1-77 (1940) (prohibiting sales to minors).
4. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Regulation No. 20, Rule 1 (pro-
hibiting sales to intoxicated persons).
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